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Has ECB communication been helpful in predicting interest rate decisions?
An evaluation of the early years of the Economic and Monetary Union.
David-Jan Jansen1 Jakob De Haan2
      De Nederlandsche Bank      University of Groningen
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Abstract
We examine the usefulness of communication by the European Central Bank for predicting its policy 
decisions during the early years of the European Economic and Monetary Union. Using ordered probit 
models based on the Taylor rule, we find that statements on the main refinancing rate and future 
inflation are significantly related to interest rate decisions. At the same time, an out-of-sample 
evaluation shows that communication-based models do not outperform models based on 
macroeconomic data in predicting decisions. Both types of models have difficulty in predicting 
changes in the main refinancing rate.
JEL classifications: E43, E52, E58
Keywords: European Central Bank, communication, interest rate decisions, Taylor rule, ordered 
probit models
1
 Corresponding author. De Nederlandsche Bank, Economics and Research Division, P.O. Box 98, 1000 AB Amsterdam,
The Netherlands, tel.: +31-20-5243170, fax: +31-20-5242514, e-mail: d.jansen@dnb.nl.
2
 Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, P.O. Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen, The Netherlands, tel.: 
+31-50-3633706, fax: +31-50-3633850, e-mail: jakob.de.haan@rug.nl.
Page 2 of 20
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
2
1. Introduction
Nowadays, monetary authorities actively use communication as an instrument of monetary 
policymaking. By commenting on future economic or policy developments, the central bank may 
influence financial markets’ expectations of upcoming interest rate decisions. Central banks may use 
various channels for their communications: regular publications (like Inflation Reports), testimonies in 
parliament, speeches, interviews, press conferences, and press releases. 
This paper studies how useful one particular form of communication by the European Central 
Bank (ECB) - namely statements by high-level policymakers - has been for predicting its policy 
decisions. During the early years of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the ECB often has 
been criticized for its communication strategy. Since late-2005, ECB communication has at times 
relied on keywords, such as ‘vigilance’, that seem a good predictor of subsequent interest rate 
decisions.3 During the early years of the EMU, these keywords were absent in communication. 
Financial market participants had to forecast ECB policy decisions on the basis of their interpretation 
of macroeconomic data or the ECB’s communicated assessment of macroeconomic developments. 
The question now arises how informative ECB communication has been during the early years of the 
EMU. We focus on the period 1999 to 2002, a sample which covers nearly all of the ECB policy 
changes during the early period. We study whether this type of communication has been informative,
and we consider how models based on central bank talk compare to models based on macroeconomic 
variables. In all cases, we use ordered probit models based on the Taylor rule. Our communication 
variables are constructed using statements by euro area central bankers in the form of interviews, 
speeches, and press conferences as reported by Bloomberg. One benefit of our study is the richness of 
our data on communication. It includes statements by all high-level euro area central bankers, also 
those comments given in between Governing Council meetings.4
Our results are as follows. Statements by euro area central bankers on the main refinancing 
rate and future inflation are significantly related to ECB policy decisions. Also, communication 
variables are jointly significant in a regression that also includes various macroeconomic series. This 
3 Jansen and De Haan (2006) show that communication by the ECB during the early years of the EMU has often been 
contradictory. Jansen and De Haan (2007) analyse the ECB´s use of the keyword `vigilance´.
4
 In the remainder of this paper, we often use the term `ECB communication´ for sake of brevity.
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3
evidence would suggest that comments by central bankers have been helpful for understanding interest 
rate decisions. However, an out-of-sample forecast evaluation shows that communication-based 
models do not outperform models based on macroeconomic data in predicting interest rate decisions. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an introduction to the 
relevant literature. This section also outlines the ordered probit model. Section 3 presents the data. 
Section 4 compares various models and section 5 considers the robustness of our findings. The final 
section offers our conclusions.
2. Using the Taylor rule to model ECB interest rate decisions
Since monetary policy is increasingly becoming the art of managing expectations, communication has 
developed into a key instrument in the central bankers’ toolbox in recent years. First, communication 
may be used to guide private sector expectations. Second, communication may be used to reduce noise 
in financial markets. The extent to which central bank communication has been successful is very 
much an empirical issue. Therefore, it is no surprise that the empirical literature on central bank 
communication has seen major developments in recent years (see Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, De 
Haan and Jansen, 2008 for a survey).
Many studies focus on the communication policy of the ECB. There is substantive evidence 
that ECB communications move financial markets in the intended direction (see, for instance, 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007).5 However, it is less clear whether communication adds information 
compared to the information contained by variables typically included in a Taylor-rule like model. For 
instance, whereas Heinemann and Ullrich (2007) and Rosa and Verga (2007) conclude that 
communication adds information not provided by Taylor-rule variables, we argue that models 
including communication indicators do not outperform straightforward Taylor rule models.6
Taylor (1993) suggested that a simple monetary policy rule relating the nominal short-term 
interest rate to inflation and the output gap accurately describes US monetary policy over the period 
5
 Also, Sager and Taylor (2004) find that announcement by the ECB Governing Council contain significant news content.
6
 Recent studies that estimate Taylor rule models for ECB monetary policy are Sauer and Sturm (2007), Belke and Polleit 
(2007), Garcia-Iglesias (2007), Moons and Van Poeck (2008), and Gorter, Jacobs and De Haan (2008).
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1987-1992. The Taylor rule seems a reasonable description of central bank behaviour in other 
countries as well. The Taylor rule models the policy interest rate i* as a linear function of inflation (), 
the equilibrium real interest rate (r*), the difference between actual inflation and target inflation (-
*) and the output gap (y). Following Sauer and Sturm (2007) and Gorter et al. (2008), when applying 
the Taylor rule to the ECB, we include money supply (M3) growth in the specification. First, 
according to the ECB, deviations between actual money growth and the so-called ‘reference value’ 
play a role in its monetary policy strategy. During the period under consideration, monetary 
developments were taken into account under the so-called ‘first pillar’ of this strategy (see De Haan, 
Eijffinger, and Waller, 2005 for further details). Second, although the empirical evidence is mixed, 
various authors report that monetary developments play a role in ECB policy decisions (see, for 
instance, Gerlach, 2007). The expanded Taylor rule can thus be written as:
i*(t)  = (t) + r* + 1 ((t) – *) + 2 y(t) + 3 (m(t) – m*) (1) 
where (m(t) – m*) denotes the difference between actual money (M3) growth and the ‘reference value’ 
for money growth. 
There are several issues that need to be addressed when taking the Taylor rule to the data. 
First, as stressed by Orphanides (2001), data should be used that were available at the time of the 
interest rate decisions. Therefore, we take our macroeconomic data from the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin 
(as in Coenen, Levin and Wieland (2005)) and publications by Consensus Forecast. Second, there is 
the issue of using backward-looking versus forward-looking information. Backward-looking 
information may be important input in the decision-making process as it presents the most recent 
information on the state of the economy. On the other hand, since the ECB aims at ensuring price 
stability in the medium run, it acts forward-looking.7 Because of these reasons, we use both backward-
7 Svensson (2003) has shown that, even if the ultimate objective of monetary policy is to stabilize inflation and output, a 
simple Taylor rule will not be optimal in a reasonable macroeconomic model. Interest rate changes affect inflation and output 
with a sizable lag. Therefore, monetary policy has to be forward-looking, i.e., it should be based on expected inflation and 
output. Realized outcomes for inflation and output enter the optimal decision rule if they help to predict future inflation and 
output.
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looking data (HICP figures, output gap estimates) and forward-looking data  (inflation expectations, 
confidence indicators). Third, the variables used should be stationary. For the macroeconomic 
variables included in our analysis, we cannot conclusively establish that all of them are I(0). Based on 
the Johansen test, we also find that these variables are not cointegrated.8 Therefore, we use the 
differenced version of equation (1):
i*(t)  = (1 + 1) (t) + 2 y(t) + 3 m(t) (2)
Most importantly, we take into account that ECB interest rate setting is a discrete rather than a 
continuous process by using an ordered probit model. A similar approach to modelling interest rate 
policy is used in Lapp, Pearce and Laksanasut (2003) and Gerlach (2007). Building on (2), we 
postulate the following index function:
i*(t)  = (1 + 1) (t) + 2 y(t) + 3 m(t) + t               (3) 
where  i*(t)  now represents a latent continuous random variable representing the preferred change in 
the ECB main refinancing rate. The actual interest rate decision  i(t) is represented as a ternary 
variable which has the value 0 if interest rates are kept constant, +1 if interest rate policy is tightened, 
and -1 if interest rate policy is eased. Interest rate policy is characterized by threshold behaviour: the 
main refinancing rate is only changed if the value of the index function is either lower than a lower 
threshold 1 or higher than an upper threshold 2. Both 1  and 2  are unobserved. Assuming that t
follows a standard normal distribution, we can write the probabilities of the different outcomes as:
Pr[i(t) = -1 ¦ z(t)] = (1 – z(t)´)
Pr[i(t) = 0 ¦ z(t)] = (2 – z(t)´ ) - (1 – z(t)´)
8
 Results are reported in the appendix. To assess stationarity, we use both augmented Dickey-Fuller tests and the 
Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992) test.  The latter test is useful as it has a higher power in small samples. See 
also Hu and Phillips (2004) for a discussion on stationarity in the context of Federal Reserve policy.
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Pr[i(t) = 1 ¦ z(t)] = 1- (2 – z(t)´)
where  denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution and z(t) is a vector with explanatory 
variables. The ordered probit model is estimated using maximum likelihood procedures as described in 
Maddala (1983). The thresholds variables 1  and 2  are estimated together with the -vector. 
We first estimate the ordered probit model using various proxies for the macroeconomic 
variables (i.e., (t), y(t) and m(t)). Next, we estimate the model using the interpretation of 
developments in these variables signalled by euro area central bankers. Instead of using the 
information provided by macro-economic realizations and forecasts, a financial analyst who wants to 
forecast the ECB policy rate might use ECB communication. Using various communication devices, 
ECB officials frequently provide their views on (future) inflation, output, and money growth. As an 
alternative, we therefore estimate an ordered probit model in which the macroeconomic variables are 
substituted by variables reflecting the signals sent by the ECB concerning inflation, output growth, and 
money growth. For each of the macroeconomic series, we substitute a signal variable S in the index 
function, which then reads as follows:
i*(t) = b1S(t) + b2Sy(t) + b3Sm(t) +t                                (4) 
where S(t) denotes the ECB signal on inflation, Sy(t) denotes the signal on economic growth9, and 
Sm(t) denotes the signal on M3, and t ~N(0,1). 
We consider one final extension to the Taylor rule. Sometimes, central bankers will directly 
communicate on the likely path of the interest rate. For example, they could state that `interest rates 
are appropriate´. Such a statement on the interest rate could be important information for market 
participants. To assess the information value of this type of statement, we also estimate a model which 
9
 We use the term `economic growth´ rather than `output gap´ here. The reason is that, in our dataset, central bankers 
communicated in terms of economic growth (i.e., growth of gross domestic product) rather than the output gap (i.e., the 
difference between actual and potential output). 
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includes a signal variable Si(t) that is based on comments on the main refinancing rate. The index 
function in this case reads as:    
i*(t) = b1S(t) + b2Sy(t) + b3Sm(t) + b4Si(t) + t                                (5) 
3. Data
For our backward-looking macroeconomic variables, we use real-time monthly data on euro area 
inflation, industrial production (excluding construction), and money growth as published in the ECB 
Monthly Bulletin. As there were two interest rate decisions per month until November 2001, the 
monthly values are, in most cases, used to explain two subsequent decisions. For inflation, we use the 
most recent value of the year-on-year change in HICP inflation as available at the time of the decision. 
For money growth, we use the most recently reported value of the three-month moving average of 
annualised growth in M3. We use the published series of industrial production (excluding 
construction) to proxy the output gap y(t). There are only a limited number of monthly figures reported 
in each Monthly Bulletin. Therefore, we add historical Eurostat data for the months that are not 
reported, starting in 1985:1. We calculate the output gap as the difference between the natural 
logarithm of the index of industrial production (1995=100) and the trend of this series, where we use a 
HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 14,400 for de-trending.
To proxy inflation expectations, we use data from Consensus Economics (see also Sauer and 
Sturm, 2007 and Gorter et al., 2008). Consensus surveys a number of financial institutions on a 
monthly basis asking for the expected change in consumer prices in the current and the next year. We 
use data for the eleven individual euro area countries that are surveyed. We include Greece beginning 
in 2002. Luxemburg is not included in the survey. For month x of a given year t, we compute expected 
inflation for each country as [(13-x)/12] times the inflation forecast for the current year plus (1-[(13-
x)/12]) times the inflation forecast for the next year. The national series are aggregated with annually-
updated real GDP weights into an expected inflation series for the euro area. Usually, the survey is 
taken around the 10th of each month and published with a short lag. Therefore, if the interest decision 
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8
was scheduled on or after the 15th of each month, we take the change in expectations between the 
current month and the previous. Otherwise, we take the lagged change.
Following, Gerlach (2007) and Sauer and Sturm (2007) we employ the economic sentiment 
indicator (ESI) published by the European Commission as the forward-looking output gap measure. 
The ESI is based on confidence indicators for consumers, the retail sector, the construction sector, and 
the manufacturing sector. The data come from the European Commission web-site. We use the 
difference between the value of the ESI in a particular month and a long-term average. The long-term 
average is calculated using a rolling window consisting of the 144 preceding months.
To measure communication, we obtained data on ECB communication by searching the 
Bloomberg news wire, scanning the news headlines for keywords such as names of euro area central 
bankers (e.g., Duisenberg, Trichet, and Issing) or issues related to monetary policy (i.e., inflation, 
economic growth, M3, and interest rates). We coded the statements of the central bankers on a ternary 
scale (-1, 0, +1) reflecting the direction in which the central banker suggested the variable to develop. 
One way to interpret this scale is to think of it as measuring `dovish´, `neutral´ and `hawkish´ 
statements on the future direction of monetary policy. Our approach in coding central bank statements 
is common in the literature on central bank communication (see Blinder et al., 2008). For example, 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) and Rosa and Verga (2007) follow a similar methodology. Table 1 
gives a number of examples of statements on the interest rate and our classification of them. Likewise, 
comments on lower (higher) levels of euro area inflation receive a -1 (+1), whereas statements with a 
positive (negative) outlook for economic growth or comments hinting at higher (lower) M3 growth are 
coded with the value +1 (-1).
Table 1 here
During our sample period (4 January 1999 to 2 May 2002), the ECB took 75 interest rate decisions, 
the first one on 7 January 1999, the last one on 2 May 2002. There were 5 downward and 7 upward 
changes in the main refinancing rate. In this period, financial markets were still getting accustomed to 
the new central bank so that communication was of paramount importance. Searching Bloomberg, we 
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9
found 925 reports containing comments by three groups of central bankers, i.e., members of the ECB 
Executive Board (EB), national central bank (NCB) presidents, and high-level policymakers of the 
Bundesbank. The possibility that the words of high-level Bundesbank officials may be informative is 
aptly illustrated by the following quote from a financial analyst: “Bundesbank council members are 
probably as close as one can get to being a fly on the ECB's wall” (Bloomberg, 1 August 2001). The 
data-set contains 277 statements on interest rates, 394 on inflation, 356 on economic growth and 98 on 
M3.  EB members made 93 statements on interest rates, 149 on inflation, 157 on economic growth and 
32 on M3. For NCB presidents, these figures are 135, 210, 174 and 49; for Bundesbank officials, the 
figures are 49, 35, 25 and 17, respectively. 
How can we relate communication on monetary policy in the time span between the interest 
rate meeting at time t-1 and the decision at time t to the decision taken at time t ? To do this, we have 
to transform the coded communications of all euro area central bankers into one summary variable. 
We focus on comments with a value different from zero as these give information on upcoming 
changes in the main refinancing rate. We construct the measure S of ECB communication per 
particular topic as follows:
Sx(t) =  td=1  (n+d – n-d) * (NTavg/Nt*Tt )                                                                                           (6)
where x may be inflation, economic growth, money growth or interest rates, n+d denotes the number of 
statements with the value +1 on day d, n-d denotes the number of statements with the value -1, day d = 
1 refers to the remaining part of the day after the interest rate meeting at time t-1, Tt denotes the 
number of days in the event window, and Nt denotes the total number of comments per topic for the 
event window related to the decision at time t. As there may be differences in the length of the event 
window as well as the number of comments made during the event window, we multiply by the ratio 
of the average value of NT in our sample (NTavg) and N*T. In summary, the indicator S captures the 
balance between signals implying `tightening´ and `easing´ whilst taking into account the relative 
number of comments and the number of days in the event window. Table 2 illustrates how 
incorporating indicators for the various topics may be useful as they contain different information. The 
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10
highest correlation coefficient – found for signals on inflation and economic growth, and for inflation 
and M3 – is only 0.47. 
Table 2 here
4. Results for the ordered probit models
Table 3 shows the estimation results for six ordered probit models of interest rate decisions. Columns 
1 and 2 present the outcomes using backward-looking variables (inflation, industrial production, and 
M3 growth). Column 3 shows estimates employing forward-looking variables (inflation expectations 
and the ESI), while columns 4 and 5 contain results using ECB communication variables. The two 
models based on communication variables have the best fit. If we include signals on inflation, 
economic growth, and M3, we find a pseudo-R2 of 0.15 (column 4). If we include the direct signal on 
the interest rate, the pseudo-R2 rises to 0.20. In contrast, the two models using backward-looking 
variables have a very poor fit. Including data on HICP, industrial production, and M3 results in a fit of 
0.07 (column 1). None of these variables are significant at the 10% level. When we drop the M3 
variable, the pseudo- R2 drops to 0.04, but the inflation variable becomes significant at the 10% level 
with a point estimate of 1.29. The fit of the Taylor rule estimated with forward-looking variables lies 
between the other four models. The coefficients of expected inflation and the economic sentiment 
indicator are significantly different from zero. 
Table 3 here
One way to assess whether communication adds information is to estimate a model encompassing both 
macroeconomic data and communication. Therefore, we have estimated a model using all 
macroeconomic series and all communication variables we have used in the above. Column 6 of Table 
2 shows the estimation results. It turns out that the ESI indicator and statements on the interest rate are 
significant in this equation. Furthermore, we can reject the null hypothesis that the communication 
variables are jointly zero (conditional on the macroeconomic variables) at the 5% level, indicating that 
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communication adds information. At the same time, we should note that more often than not, the 
coefficients for the individual signal variables are not significant.
Table 4 reports marginal effects for four specifications: two using macroeconomic data and 
two using communication variables.10 We find particularly strong results for the forward-looking 
macroeconomic variables. A 1%-point increase in our measure of expected inflation leads to an 
increase in the probability of higher interest rates of 0.56. For the economic sentiment indicator a 1%-
point increase leads to a 0.39 rise in the probability of higher interest rates and reduces the probability 
of a rate reduction by 0.23. Also, we find that a 1%-point increase of realized HICP inflation increases 
the probability of a higher interest rate by 0.20. The effects of the communication variables are smaller 
in absolute terms:  a 1-point higher signal on euro area inflation decreases the probability of a policy 
easing by 0.01, while a 1-point higher signal on the main refinancing rate increases the likelihood of 
tighter policy by 0.02. The fact that the marginal effects for the communication variables are smaller 
may be due to different scales of measurement.
Table 4 here
Which of these models is better suited to predict the next interest rate decision? To answer this 
question, we use rolling-window out-of-sample forecasts. We start by estimating each model using the 
first 25 observations and then generate the probability that each model attaches to a decision of higher, 
constant, or lower interest rates at t = 26. Next, we re-estimate the models using the first 26 
observations and predict the decision at t = 27, and so on. In general, the models give accurate 
predictions in cases when rates were left unchanged. That  is to say, the probability of constant interest 
rates is equal to or larger than 50% in most of these cases. Only in 5% of the cases do we find a 
predicted change when actually no change took place. However, this is not surprising, given that the 
unconditional probability of no change in the interest rates was 84%. Also, we find that the models 
have great difficulty in predicting interest rate changes as they fail to generate a probability of change 
10 In the remainder of the paper, we no longer report results for the model including changes in money growth. Results 
including M3 are similar to those reported.
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of at least 50% in all cases when rates were actually changed. The closest prediction is for 27 April 
2000 when both models based exclusively on communication generate a probability of higher rates of 
34%. There is no clear ranking for the models in terms of ability to predict changes in the main 
refinancing rate. Overall the differences are small. For decisions to tighten policy the model with 
backward-looking macroeconomic data is most accurate in three of the six cases. However, for 
decisions to ease policy it is least accurate in two out of four cases. For both types of decisions, the 
model with forward-looking variables gives the best prediction in four out of ten cases. However, it 
gives the worst prediction in two cases and also incorrectly predicts changes in the policy rate on two 
occasions. In five out of ten cases, one of the communication-based models gives the best prediction. 
However, in the other cases, these models generate the worst prediction. Additionally, both 
communication models incorrectly predict three changes in the policy rate.11
5. Robustness
We explored the robustness of the results in several ways.12 First, we re-estimated the ordered probit 
models using also lags of the explanatory variables. Central bankers may signal rate changes earlier 
than in the inter-meeting period which we use as the event window. Also, in setting the interest rate, 
they may take lagged values of the macroeconomic variables into account. However, including more 
lags does not change our main results. Most importantly, we are unable to substantially improve the 
forecasting ability of the models. 
Second, we considered whether allowing for interest rate smoothing may influence the results. 
We implemented this by including lagged values of the interest rate decision  i(t) into the model. 
However, this adjustment also did not improve the ability of the models to predict interest rate 
changes, although in some cases the lagged decisions were significant. 
Thirdly, in order to check whether it is appropriate to include comments by high-level officials 
of the Bundesbank, we created separate signal variables for this group of central bankers. It turned out 
11 The decision to lower rates by 50 basis points on 17 September 2001 was unscheduled. It came in the aftermath of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks in the United States. In this individual case, the results may be biased in favour of the communication-based 
models. After such an event, communication will adjust more quickly and be more readily available than forward-looking 
variables.
12 We only describe the results of these extensions in broad terms here. Detailed results are available on request from the 
corresponding author.
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that the communication variables are significant in the ordered probit model which suggests that 
including Bundesbank statements is justified. 
6. Conclusions
This paper has studied the predictability of ECB interest rate decisions based on ECB communication 
and macroeconomic data. We find that decisions are most closely linked to changes in inflation 
expectations and economic sentiment. However, comments by euro area central bankers on the main 
refinancing rate and future inflation are also helpful in modelling interest rate decisions. At the same 
time, we find no great difference in the predictive power of models based on communication and 
macroeconomic data. In general, the models have great difficulty in explaining changes in the main 
refinancing rate. However, decisions to leave rates unchanged are usually correctly predicted. Our 
results differ from those of Rosa and Verga (2007) who find that statements by the ECB president at 
the press conference following an interest rate decision have predictive power, even if Taylor-rule like 
variables are included. This suggests that different channels of central bank communication may not 
be equally informative.
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Table 1: Examples of classification of ECB statements on interest rates
Date and time 
stamp
Who? Comments News report headline Our coding
19/5/99 at 12:43 Trichet It would be 
inappropriate
ECB’s Trichet sees no further 
scope for further ECB cuts
0
09/09/99 at 08:48 Quaden The next move will 
probably be a move 
upwards
ECB’s Quaden sees faster growth 
pushing rates higher
+1
28/03/00 at 08:42 Rojo Europe’s growing 
economy is likely to 
lead to more interest 
rate increases
Bank of Spain’s Rojo sees rate 
rise; Says stocks overvalued
+1
12/12/00 at 13:31 Welteke Under the given 
circumstances I regard 
current central bank 
rates as appropriate
ECB’s Welteke on inflation, 
interest rates, the euro: Comment
0
28/01/02 at 11:25 Noyer this could be a case for 
a slight reduction in 
benchmark rates
Noyer says ECB may cut rates if 
growth, inflation slows, BZ says
-1 
Notes: Source of all quotes is Bloomberg. Dates are listed as DD/MM/YY. The final column shows our coding of the 
comments. 
Page 17 of 20
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
17
Table 2: correlations between communication indicators
Signal on: Inflation Economic growth M3
Economic growth 0.47 - -
M3 0.47 0.40 -
Interest rates 0.42 0.17 0.26
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Table 3: Full sample results for ordered probit models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Macro data
(backward)
Macro data
(backward)
Macro data
(Forward)
ECB 
comments
ECB 
comments
Macro data 
+ comments
 
(HICP)
0.86
(0.57)
1.29*
(0.66)
0.43
(1.03)
y 
(IP)
-0.02
(0.19)
0.04
(0.17)
-0.28
(0.25)
m
(M3)
-1.02
(0.67)
-0.51
(0.88)
e
(Consensus)
4.36**
(2.10)
1.92
(3.42)
y
(ESI)
3.01**
(0.98)
1.98*
(1.12)
Signal on:
Inflation 0.13**
(0.06)
0.08
(0.06)
0.02
(0.08)
Economic
growth
0.05
(0.07)
0.06
(0.06)
0.06
(0.07)
M3 0.27*
(0.17)
0.27
(0.18)
0.27
(0.20)
Interest 
rates
0.22
(0.12)
0.23*
(0.12)
1 -1.65*** -1.51*** -1.78*** -1.55*** -1.47*** -1.65***
2 1.36*** 1.42*** 1.53*** 1.79*** 2.05*** 2.21***
Pseudo-R2 0.07 0.04 0.14 0.15 0.20 0.26
Note: Sample period is 4 January 1999 to 2 May 2002. Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes significance at the 
10/5/1 % level. Hubert-White robust estimates of variance is used in all cases.
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Table 4: Marginal effects for four selected specifications
Effects on:
Pr[i(t) = -1] Pr[i(t) = 0] Pr[i(t) = 1]
Macro data Comments Macro data Comments Macro data Comments
 (HICP) -0.15 -0.05 0.20**
y (IP) 0.00 0.00 0.01
e(Consensus) -0.34 -0.22 0.56**
y (ESI) -0.23** -0.16 0.39**
Signal on:
Inflation -0.01* -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01
Economic
growth
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
M3 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.03
Interest rates -0.02 -0.01 0.02*
Note: Marginal effects are evaluated at sample means. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1 % level
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Appendix: Stationarity and cointegration tests for macroeconomic variables used in the Taylor rule.
Table A.1: Results for ADF-test and KPSS-test
ADF-test KPSS-test
t-statistic # lags LM-statistic
 (HICP) -1.52 0 1.01***
e (Consensus) -1.98 2 0.62**
y (IP) -1.42 0 0.26
y (ESI) -1.47 0 0.40*
m (M3) -2.07 2 0.28
i -0.89 0 0.69**
Note: The ADF-test assumes a unit root under the null hypothesis. The KPSS test assumes that the series is stationary under 
the null hypothesis. The number of lags for the ADF-test is selected on the basis of the Schwartz criterion. All test equations 
contain a constant. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1% level.
Table A.2. Results for Johansen test
Cointegration 
between:
Hypothesised # 
cointegrating 
equations
Eigenvalue Trace statistic 5% critical 
value
None 0.16 18.96 29.80
At most one 0.06 6.46 15.49
HICP, IP and M3
At most two 0.03 2.20 3.84
None 0.20 13.47 15.49Consensus and ESI
At most one 0.13 4.27 3.84
Note: A constant was allowed for in the cointegrating equations.
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